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Abstract 
 
The design of a safety system is critical if functionality is to be maximised and 
consequences reduced.  There is often a trade off between the performance 
obtainable and the resources available.  To address these balancing issues, 
which are usually impractical by hand for a designer, multi-objective 
optimisation techniques can be used.  When considering safety systems there 
is often the situation of dependencies between components, for example with 
regard to maintenance.  To evaluate the system behaviour in these situations 
an appropriate analysis method is required.  The aim of this paper is to 
present an optimisation approach which integrates traditional methods of 
system failure evaluation.  The combined method uses the fault tree analysis 
technique to represent the causes of failure on demand of the system, the 
binary decision diagram and Markov methods for system quantification (for 
independent and dependent sections of the fault tree respectively), and the 
Improved Strength Pareto Evolutionary Approach (SPEA2) to find the most 
optimal design solution. The end product is a mechanism to yield the best 
design option for safety systems incorporating dependencies.  The paper 
presents the principles of the method and a case study to illustrate how the 
method is applied.  The results produced, along with conclusions are 
provided. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When designing a system using the traditional techniques of design, test and 
redesign the output is often adequate in terms of performance, meeting the 
required safety standard, but one that is not necessarily optimal.  Attempting 
to optimize the design of engineered safety systems, the analyst is frequently 
faced with the demand of achieving several targets (e.g. low costs, high 
revenues, high reliability, low accident risks), some of which are often in 
conflict. At the same time, several requirements (e.g. maximum allowable 
cost, weight, volume etc.) should also be satisfied. Traditionally this type of 
problem has been solved by focusing the optimisation on a single objective 
which may be a weighed combination of some of the targets of the design 
problem.  More recently the benefits of applying a multi-objective approach 
have been identified.   
 
During the last decade a number of engineers have applied various methods 
for safety system optimisations.  Preference has swayed to using modern 
approaches, evolutionary methods, due to their ability to cater for integer 
variable design parameters, small search space regions, and linear and 
nonlinear objective function characteristics.  Among these methods genetic 
algorithms have been applied most often due to their simplicity and 
universality, with considerable success.  Cantoni et al. [1], Busacca et al. [2], 
Marseguerra et al. [3], Martorell et al. [4], and Everson and Fieldsend, [5], all 
have applied a multi-objective optimisation procedure incorporating the 
genetic algorithm principle to safety related and critical systems producing 
optimal outcomes.  For each safety system problem the specifics of the 
approach need to be tailored to the characteristics of the system and the 
constraints under analysis.  This research and others have shown the 
capability of the multi-objective approach and is the focus of this paper. 
 
To extend the applicability of using an optimisation approach there is a need 
to deal with systems that have dependent characteristics.  The method of 
optimisation developed in this research integrates techniques that can 
accommodate such dependencies.  This paper considers an application to an 
offshore safety system (a high integrity protection system), which has ten 
design variables, four objectives, and maintenance type dependencies.  The 
objectives relate to minimizing system cost, unavailability, spurious trip 
frequency and maintenance down time.  The dependencies exist between 
groups of components which are maintained by the same engineer.  The 
approach developed integrates the fault tree, binary decision diagram, Markov 
and multi-objective evolutionary methods. Dependencies within the system 
are highlighted within the fault tree structure and these sections are analysed 
with the Markov approach.  This keeps the analysis of such sections to a 
minimal form and hence aids the efficiency of the overall optimisation 
approach.  The research uses the multi-objective improved strength Pareto 
evolutionary approach (SPEA2) [6].  The results of the research illustrate the 
applicability of the approach and the need to consider dependencies to 
prevent an underestimation of the system performance. 
 
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The second section 
considers the integrated optimisation method.  Section 3 overviews the 
application safety system and defines the optimisation objectives, with the 
fourth section detailing the implementation to the case study problem. Section 
5 discusses the results obtained, with the main conclusions given in the final 
section. 
 
2. Integrated Optimisation Method 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
Previous research [7] has illustrated the suitability of combining the well-
known techniques of fault tree analysis and the binary decision diagram 
method within an optimisation approach. The use of these methods is 
adequate only if all component failures occur independently, since the 
techniques are not able to take into account the dependencies. It is rare that 
real safety systems consist of just independent components in terms of failure 
or (and) repair. Failure to identify the dependency in the system would result 
in an incorrect system performance evaluation (for example, unavailability and 
failure frequency prediction). Therefore, an appropriate modelling technique is 
required to overcome the problems.  This papers introduces a new 
methodology enabling optimisation of safety systems with dependencies by 
effective use of the Markov modelling tool.  Incorporation of the standard fault 
tree analysis (FTA) and binary decision diagram (BDD) methods are 
maintained.  An overview of the approach is given in figure 1 and discussed in 
sections 2.2-2.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Flow chart of optimisation approach 
 
2.2 Explicit Objective Evaluation 
 
There are two main categories of objectives: explicit and implicit. Explicit ones 
can be determined and easily evaluated from an explicit function of the design 
variables. In contrast, implicit objectives can only be evaluated by a full 
analysis of the system. Cost is an example of an explicit objective, where a 
function can be generated for evaluation.  The form of each function is 
specific to each optimisation application.  
 
2.3 Implicit Objective Evaluation 
 
2.3.1 Representation: As the application of the developed optimisation 
methodology is to safety systems, the primary performance criteria relates to 
its functionality.  Changing design variables will change the system 
functionality representation therefore a full analysis is required for each design 
option.  System performance measures can be obtained by using the fault 
tree analysis method. Fault trees are used to quantify the system 
unavailability of each potential design. Constructing a fault tree for each 
design variation would be a time consuming task, hence, impractical. To 
overcome this house events [8] can be used.  These enable the construction 
of a single fault tree capable of representing the causes of the system failure 
mode for every possible system design.  
 
 
 
2.3.2 Quantification:  To analyse the fault tree used for representation of the 
performance of the system the latest BDD technique has been used. The If-
Then-Else construction method developed by Rauzy [9] is implemented.  The 
method allows exact system quantification in a more efficient manner than the 
traditional kinetic tree theory technique.   
 
The additional feature of the optimisation approach developed is the inclusion 
of the Markov method to evaluate sections of the fault tree where there are 
dependent events.  The process involves the following steps[10]: 
 
Step 1 - Fault tree simplification and modularization in order to obtain 
independent modules containing specific dependency groups.  
Step 2 - Markov analysis of these groups.  
 
As a result, the conventional fault tree structure is maintained.  To illustrate 
consider the fault tree given in figure 2, where the top event (Gate1) has two 
dependency groups: group  one is represented by events A and B (coloured 
in grey), and group two consists of events D and E (identified with a striped 
pattern).  
 
Figure 2 – Example fault tree including dependencies 
 
During the modularisation process in finding modules of the tree some are 
relatively straightforward, for example Gate3.  Its inputs always occur together 
with no other elements from the tree and hence form a module. However 
other elements make identifying modules more difficult. For example, when 
trying to group parts of the fault tree containing the dependency group of D 
and E the event C (coloured in black) is an obstacle as it occurs elsewhere in 
the tree.  In such circumstances modules within modules are created.  This 
enables the smallest Markov model to be constructed at all times.  The end 
result for this example fault tree is given in figure 3, where Mod 1 represents 
Gate3.  It is a minimal module for the dependency group with A and B. 
Module 2 (Mod2) is an OR combination of Gate5 and Gate4. It should be 
noted that Gate4 includes Gate3, which will be replaced by module 1 (Mod1).  
 
Figure 3 – Resulting modularised fault tree 
 
When the fault tree modularization into independent sections is finished, the 
analysis of these independent sub-trees will be carried out by the Markov 
method, if the section contains dependent components; or by the binary 
decision diagram, if all sub-tree components are independent.  For instances 
where there are multiple modules in dependent sections of the tree, each are 
analysed in turn.  For the example in figure 3, when the Markov analysis 
starts, Mod 1 will be analysed first and changed to a basic event and, hence, 
enable the analysis of Mod 2.  If the dependent component groups could not 
be separated even after the use of the suggested technique, the whole fault 
tree is treated as a module and goes through the Markov analysis. 
 
2.4 Optimisation Methodology 
 
The main goal of multi-objective optimisation is the search for acceptable 
solutions to problems that incorporate several performance criteria. The 
technique used to find the optimal system design incorporates the issues of 
pareto optimality and dominance, and is the Improved Strength Pareto 
Optimisation Approach (SPEA2) [6].  The algorithm works through six steps, 
as follows: 
 
Step 1. Initialization: Generate an initial population and create the empty 
archive (external set).  
Step 2. Fitness assignment: Calculate fitness values of individuals in initial 
population. 
Step 3. Environmental selection: Copy all nondominated individuals to the 
archive. If its size exceeds the allowable size then reduce the archive by 
means of the truncation operator, otherwise fill the archive with dominated 
individuals from initial population. Important notice: the number of individuals 
contained in the archive is constant over time. 
Step 4. Termination: If the maximum number of generations is reached or 
another stopping criterion is satisfied then set the nondominated set to the set 
of decision vectors represented by the nondominated individuals in the 
archive. Stop. 
Step 5. Mating selection: Perform binary tournament selection with 
replacement on the archive in order to fill the mating pool.  
Step 6. Variation: Apply recombination and mutation operators to the mating 
pool and set the archive to the resulting population. Increment generation 
counter and go to Step2. 
 
3. Application Safety System 
 
3.1  The system 
 
A safety system of a not normally manned offshore platform is considered in 
this research.  The high integrity protection systems (HIPS) function is to 
prevent a high-pressure surge passing through it, with the aim to prevent an 
overpressure situation on processing equipment downstream.  Figure 4 
represents the main features of the HIPS [12]. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Structure of High-Integrity Protection System   
 
There are two separate subsystems involved, the first level of protection is via 
the Emergency Shutdown sub-system (sub-system 1) and a secondary level 
of protection is via the high integrity protection system (sub-system 2).  The 
first level of protection acts to close the Wing and Master valves together  with 
any valves that have been fitted when pressure in the pipeline exceeds the 
permitted value. This value is monitored using pressure transmitters (PT).  
The secondary sub-system is completely independent in operation and its 
method of protection is the same as the primary protective mechanism. 
 
3.2  Optimisation Objectives 
 
The objective of this design optimisation problem is to minimize four system 
parameters: unavailability (Qsys), spurious trip frequency (Fsys), cost (Cost) 
and maintenance down time (MDT).  These parameters have been chosen as 
they are influencing factors in maintaining a high level of functionality of a 
system required to operate on demand.  As a multi-objective approach is used 
there is a balance between the four objectives, and in practice the choice of 
system design is not unlimited. In this case, there are three limitations (upper 
bounds) set. The total cost of the system must be less than one thousand 
units. The average time each year that the system resides in the down state 
due to preventative maintenance is a maximum of one hundred and thirty 
hours. If the number of times that a spurious system shutdown occurs is more 
than once per year then it is deemed unacceptable.  
 
 
 
 
3.3  Design variables and limitations 
 
For many design problems given only a relatively small number of design 
changes the list of potential designs quickly becomes impractical to evaluate 
by hand.  For this system ten design variables are defined (table 1).  One 
assumption made in this analysis is that when a valve type is selected, all 
valves are fitted as this type.  For each component the information required 
for the analysis includes failure data, maintenance times and costs.  For the 
failure data each component can fail either in a dormant mode or spuriously. 
A dormant failure can be described as the inability of the component to carry 
out its desired task on demand. In contrast, spurious failure results from the 
component carrying  out its desired function when its operation is not 
required. This data will be used subsequently when calculating the 
unavailability and spurious trip probability of the HIPS.  The cost and 
maintenance data is used for calculation of the remaining two objectives. 
 
Variable Description Value 
θ1, θ2 Inspection intervals for subsystems 1 and 2 1 week – 2 years
V Valve type 1 or 2 
P Pressure transmitter type 1 or 2 
N1, N2 Number of pressure transmitters fitted in 
subsystem 1 and 2 respectively 
1 – 4, 0 – 4 
K1, K2 
  
Number of pressure transmitters required to 
trip (activate) for subsystem 1 and 2 
respectively 
1 – N1,  
0 – N2 
E Number of ESD valves fitted 0 – 2 
H Number of HIPS valves fitted 0 – 2 
 
Table 1 - Main HIPS variables 
 
The main types of dependency which are frequently encountered in many 
safety systems are maintenance, standby, secondary failure, initiator-enabler 
and test dependencies [8].  The focus of this paper is to cater for the issue of 
maintenance dependency (other dependency situations are discussed in the 
conclusions), which is common for all safety systems.  This situation arises 
when one maintenance engineer or a team of engineers has to take 
responsibility for a group of components usually of the same or similar type. If 
several components from the same maintenance group fail subsequently, only 
one of them goes through the repair process. Others wait in a queue for repair 
until the engineer has restored the first component.  The queuing affects 
repair times and, hence, the probability of failure of other components. 
Therefore, the maintenance dependency affects the whole system and 
influences its performance statistics.  In total eight dependency groups have 
been identified for the HIPS structure. Group one links the pressure 
transmitters of type 1, group 2 the pressure transmitters of type 2, group 3 
includes subsystem 1 elements - wing valve, master valve, ESD valves (type 
1) and also subsystem 2 HIPS valves of type 1.  Group 4 is the same as 
group 3 but for type 2 components.  These four groups relate to the 
unavailability fault tree and similar groups are constructed for the spurious trip 
fault tree. It is assumed that each group is maintained by one engineer.  
 
4. Case Study Implementation 
 
4.1. Explicit Objectives 
 
The explicit objectives relate to the derivation of system cost and maintenance 
down time.  Cost  of  the  HIPS  design  can be calculated using equation 1.  
 
Cost = Cost(subsys1)+Cost(subsys2) ≤ 1000                       (1) 
 
The cost of each sub-system includes the cost of the valves of type 1 and 
type 2, the cost of the PT of type 1 and 2, and the cost of the solenoid valves. 
There is also a constant included to accommodate the fixed costs of both 
subsystems.  
 
Similarly, the average maintenance down time (MDT) is calculated as a sum 
of the maintenance down time of subsystem 1 and subsystem 2 for each 
potential design (equation 2): 
    
   MDT  =  MDT(subsys1) + MDT(subsys2) <130                     (2) 
 
Included in this formula are the test times of the valve of type 1 and type 2, 
the test times of the pressure transmitter of type 1 and 2, and the test time of 
the solenoid valve. Again there are constants referring to the sum of the test 
times for the fixed components in each subsystem. Full details are given in 
reference [7]. 
 
Limitations are set on these objectives and penalties are incurred on the 
unavailability value when violation occurs (these are explained in detail in 
reference 12). The resulting value is a penalized system unavailability, which 
participates in the optimisation procedure. 
 
4.2 Implicit Objectives 
 
4.2.1 Representation: A full system analysis is required for the evaluation of 
the system unavailability.  The top event of the HIPS unavailability fault tree 
represents the causes of the system failing to protect the processing 
equipment. The top event ‘Safety system fails to protect’ will occur if all (Wing, 
Master, ESD and HIPS) valves along the pipeline fail to close. In total the fault 
tree consists of 154 gates, 38 basic events representing component failures, 
and 40 house events representing the design options.  
 
The spurious trip frequency for each design is also an implicit objective that 
requires the use of fault tree analysis to assess its value. House events are 
again used to construct a fault tree capable of representing each potential 
design for this failure mode. The causal relationship ‘HIPS fails spuriously’ is 
represented by the sub-events ‘Wing or Master Valve Fails Spuriously’, ‘ESD 
Subsystem Fails Spuriously’ and ‘HIPS Subsystem Fails Spuriously’ related 
by ‘OR’ logic. The fault tree consists of 142 gates, 38 basic events and 40 
house events.  
 
4.2.2 Quantification: The C++ package was used to build the HIPS 
optimisation software called ISPEASSOP (Improved Strength Pareto 
Evolutionary Algorithm Safety System Optimisation Procedure).  There are 
three main parts of the program. Part one is responsible for the HIPS 
structure, part two is responsible for quantitative analysis and part three is the 
implemented SPEA2 algorithm for the HIPS optimisation. The key steps for 
the quantification phase are summarised in figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Program structure for quantification phase 
 
These steps are repeated for each design created during the optimisation 
process.  After quantification of the dependent sections these are submitted 
back into the fault tree and analysis is carried out using the standard BDD 
technique.  The outcome is a value for unavailability or spurious trip frequency 
(depending on the tree analysed) which is used within the optimisation 
process to determine the ‘best’ design option. 
 
4.3  Optimisation Parameters 
 
To implement the SPEA2 optimisation methodology some predefined values 
are required.  After testing, the values which yielded the most efficient 
approach were: a population (and archive) of 20 strings; a probability of 0.7 
for the crossover rate; a probability of 0.01 for the mutation rate; and a 
termination criterion of 100 generations. 
 
In terms of the representation within the algorithm, each design option forms a 
string where a binary coding was used.  Each parameter was allocated a 
particular length of the string, i.e. a particular number of bits, in order to 
accommodate the largest possible value in binary form. In total, each string 
representing all design variables is 32 bits in length. It can be interpreted as a 
set of concatenated integers in binary form, as shown in figure 6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Binary representation of solution string 
 
A modified crossover operator was used, which was a deviant of the single 
point crossover process. The procedure works through the following steps:  
 
Step 1. The random number is generated. 
Step 2. If the generated number is smaller than the crossover rate, the pair of 
population strings j and j+1 are crossed at the randomly chosen position. If 
not, step one repeats for the pair of strings j+1 and j+2. (This would be strings 
j+2 and j+3 in the traditional single point crossover process). 
Step 3.  If population end is not reached the process repeats from step one 
for the next string in the population.  
 
5. Results 
 
The results from the optimisation of the HIPS with dependencies have been 
tested against those obtained for the same system ignoring any dependencies 
(in this case the standard FTA and BDD quantification occurs).  The best ten 
designs obtained after ten runs of each program have been compared. Table 
2 shows the results (WO refers to without dependencies, W with 
dependencies) . The corresponding design parameter values are provided in 
table 3. 
 
Run 
No. 
Cost MDT Fsys Qsys 
WO W WO W WO W WO W 
1 592 129.7008 0.455 0.476 4.50e-7 5.32e-7 
2 512 129.6974 0.332 0.389 8.33e-4 9.26e-4 
3 582 128.7361 0.324 0.350 6.80e-4 7.25e-4 
4 922 128.2273 0.718 0.766 1.00e-6 8.20e-6 
5 882 129.1590 0.166 0.235 1.00e-6 1.60e-6 
6 992 129.2523 0.552 0.612 1.00e-6 8.04e-6 
7 852 128.3286 0.245 0.295 6.55e-4 1.06e-3 
8 542 128.9881 0.324 0.387 8.45e-4 9.01e-4 
9 872 129.9032 0.377 0.437 1.00e-6 5.93e-6 
10 862 129.7309 0.999 0.999 1.00e-6 8.88e-6 
 
Table 2 - Comparison of the results with and without dependencies 
 
 
It can be seen from table 2 that implementation of maintenance dependency 
for the HIPS components resulted in a higher system unavailability and 
spurious trip frequency values for all designs. These changes can be 
explained by the increase of repair times for individual components due to the 
implemented dependency.  In terms of selecting the ideal safety system 
design any one of the 10 could be chosen depending on the particular 
objective given the most precedence. 
 
Run No. Q1 Q2 V P N1 N2 K1 K2 E H 
1 25 73 1 2 1 3 1 3 0 1 
2 27 105 2 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 
3 64 9 2 1 4 0 3 0 1 0 
4 33 96 1 1 2 3 1 3 1 1 
5 42 53 1 2 4 2 4 1 1 1 
6 34 90 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 
7 40 91 1 2 3 0 3 0 2 0 
8 27 118 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 
9 26 124 1 2 3 2 3 2 0 2 
10 42 46 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 
 
Table 3 - Design parameter values for Table 2 
 
6 Discussion 
 
The fault tree simplification and modularization methods along with the 
Markov analysis have been incorporated into a new optimisation tool in order 
to allow the effective search for an optimal safety system design with multiple 
objectives and maintenance dependency issues. 
 
The new technique has been demonstrated on the HIPS system. Comparison 
of results utilising the assumption that the system components are all 
independent and those, obtained by the suggested optimisation technique for 
the system with dependencies, shows that for all potential original HIPS 
designs the system unavailability and spurious failure frequency have been 
underestimated. Therefore, it is important to identify all system dependencies 
for more accurate system unavailability and spurious failure frequency 
prediction.  
 
In its current form the developed methodology widens the field of application 
for optimisation studies.  Consideration of other dependency types could 
easily be added to the programs capabilities to further enhance its scope.  
The main weakness of the optimisation tool is its running time. One run of the 
program for independent system components is in order of minutes, however, 
the dependent version requires several hours, due to the complexity of 
Markov analysis for a large number of system components even after the fault 
tree modularization.  
 
Potentially the Markov model size for maintenance dependency type could be 
reduced by increasing the number of maintenance engineers. That would 
result in the dependent component elimination from the model for each 
additional engineer. This factor could be easily implemented into the 
optimisation code. On the other hand, additional maintenance staff would 
cause the increase of the system life cycle cost. Hence, such an improvement 
measure should be considered carefully for each potential system design. 
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